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Abstract 
 
Recent reviews of moral development theory (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007) 
demonstrate that revisionist theoretical perspectives have cross cultural validity, but 
moral development in relation to people with intellectual disabilities (IDs) has not been 
considered within this literature.  A structured review of the published literature relating 
to children, adolescents and adults with IDs, and moral development was carried out.  
Twenty studies meeting the inclusion criteria were found.  The review indicated that 
people with IDs may not progress through the developmental stages of moral reasoning 
as quickly as typically developing peers, or reach the more advanced stages.  This 
difference from non-disabled peers tends to disappear if groups are matched on some 
measure of cognitive ability.  However, the studies are fraught with methodological 
problems and there is a need for further research, given the theoretical developments 
within the area of moral development, including the evidence of a relationship between 
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Developing an understanding of the literature pertaining to the moral development of 
people with intellectual disabilities 
 
Moral reasoning refers to the cognitive and emotional processes occurring within a 
person when they are attempting to determine whether or not an event is morally ³ULJKWRU
ZURQJ´.  Some theorists emphasise cognition as being crucial to moral reasoning, while 
recognising emotion as having an important role (Gibbs, 2003, 2010).  Others emphasise 
emotion, but acknowledge the importance of cognition (Hoffman, 2000).   Regardless of 
the theoretical view that is adopted, moral development refers to the changes that occur to 
the structure of moral reasoning with increasing maturity, both as a consequence of social 
perspective taking and increasing cognitive ability.   
 
Moral development is associated with the development of cognitive abilities such as 
abstract reasoning and planning ability (Hoffman, 1977; Johnson, 1962; Tomlinson-
Keasey & Keasey, 1974).  In addition, processes such as social perspective taking 
(Selman, 1976, 1980) and decentration relate to moral development, together with factors  
such as parenting practices (Boyes & Allen, 1993; Buck, Walsh, & Rothman, 1981; Hart, 
1988; Powers, 1988; Speicher, 1994; Walker & Taylor, 1991), and peer socialisation 
(Keasey, 1971).   Many of these factors also relate to social perspective taking, and it has 
been suggested that as opportunities for social interaction increase, social perspective 
taking increases, and moral development subsequently occurs (Berkowitz, Gibbs, & 
Broughton, 1980; Kruger, 1992).   However, there has been little examination of the 
moral development of those individuals who experience some kind of developmental 
delay, in terms of their general cognitive development, or who may not have had the 
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same opportunities to engage in social perspective taking as typically developing 
children.   
 
Aspects of cognitive ability, such as attention and memory, are associated with moral 
development.  For example, Knight, Dubro & Chao (1985) reported that aspects of 
memory are related to the development of social values, while Stewart & Pascual-Leone 
(1992) found that attentional and mental capacity are linked to moral development in 
children.  Educational attainment and chronological age are widely recognised as being 
associated with moral reasoning (Dawson, 2002), and studies using large samples of 
children from the general population have demonstrated a significant positive relationship 
between IQ and moral development (Hoffman; 1977; Johnson, 1962), supporting the 
theoretical relationship between cognitive and moral development.  However, little 
appears to be known about the moral reasoning abilities of people with intellectual 
disabilities (IDs).    
 
Children, adolescents and adults are considered to have IDs if they have a tested 
intelligence quotient (IQ) below 70, accompanied by significant impairments in their 
adaptive behaviours, with an onset of these difficulties prior to the age of 18 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health Organisation, 1994).  The prevalence of 
challenging and aggressive behaviours amongst people with IDs is elevated (Borthwick-
Duffy, 1994; Cooper et al., 2009; McClean & Walsh, 1995), and while the literature is 
fraught with difficulties (for reviews see, Holland, Clare, & Mukhopadhyay, 2002; 
Murphy & Mason, 2007), it has been claimed that the prevalence of illegal behaviour 
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may be higher amongst people with IDs (Hayes, 1993, 1996; Hodgins, 1992; Hodgins, 
Mednick, Brennan, Schulsinger, & Engberg, 1996; Mulrooney, Murphy, Harrold, & 
Carey, 2004).  If moral development is associated with cognitive development and with 
antisocial behaviour amongst children and adolescents (Blasi, 1980; Nelson, Smith, & 
Dodd, 1990; Richards, Bear, Stewart, & Norman, 1992; Stams et al., 2006), and people 
with IDs are at greater risk of anti-social behaviours, then moral development theory may 
be of some value in understanding the aetiology of such difficulties amongst this 
population and may provide an effective theoretical rationale governing clinical 
interventions.  
 
This supposition is important to consider as many clinical interventions for children, 
adolescents and adults with IDs include the use of applied behaviour analysis or 
psychotropic medication (see Emerson, 2001; Stenfert-Kroese, 1997; Tyrer et al., 2008), 
ignoring the role of cognition.  Despite some evidence to the contrary (Taylor, Lindsay, 
& Willner, 2008), there still is an assumption amongst clinicians that people with IDs 
may not benefit from µWDONLQJWKHUDSLHV¶(Hurley, Pfadt, Tomasulo, & Gardner, 1996).  
These assumptions reflect the exclusion of people with IDs from theoretical 
developments which underpin applied psychological interventions.  This is an issue for 
all psychological theories, including moral development theory, which should be 
inclusive of all members of society, and not just those who are seen to be typically 
developing children, adolescents or adults.   However, moral development theory is 
potentially contentious when considered in relation to people with IDs, as the word 
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³PRUDO´LQUHODtion to this population, has an unfortunate history (Fennell, 1996; Trent, 
1994).   
 
In recent years there has been the development of a µFLWL]HQVKLS¶DJHQGDIRUSHRSOHZLWK
IDs within England, encouraged by the publication of the White Paper Valuing People  
and its update (Department of Health, 2001, 2007).  A similar agenda was reflected in the 
3UHVLGHQW¶V&RPPLWWHHIRU3HRSOHZLWK,QWHOOHFWXDO'LVDELOLWLHV (2004) in the United 
States with the publication of a report that encouraged the development of financial and 
personal freedom for people with IDs. Considering this, and theoretical developments 
within moral development theory, we believe it is timely to revisit the existing literature 
and consider the implications for people with IDs.  We therefore undertook a structured 
review of the literature, looking at moral reasoning and moral development theory in 
relation to children, adolescents and adults with IDs.  
 
Method 
We undertook a structured review of the literature by searching electronic databases of 
published papers such as PsychInfo, Medline and the Science Citation Index, using the 
VHDUFKWHUPV³mental retard*1³LPEHFLOH´1³VXEQRUPDO´1, ³KDQGLFDS´1,³OHDUQLQJ´
³LQWHOOHFWXDO´RU³GHYHORSPHQWDO´ µ¶disability¶¶ or µ¶ difficulty¶¶DQG³PRUDO´7KLVZDV
supplemented by using the ancestry method.  Results were rejected if the paper did not 
include participants who had an ID defined by an IQ <70, and did not attempt to 
                                                 
1
 Many of these terms are objectionable. Unfortunately, until recently, they were widely used in the 
µVFLHQWLILFOLWHUDWXUH¶. We included them in our search to ensure that no relevant older articles were missed.  
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investigate moral reasoning or moral development.  Papers were only included if they had 
been published in a journal in which submitted papers were subject to peer-review.   
 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Articles were classified according to the theoretical stance adopted by the authors: Piaget, 
Kohlberg or other, and then further divided according to the methods employed within 
each study (e.g. longitudinal studies, cross sectional matched groups, cross sectional 
single group, or qualitative research). 
 
Results 
We were able to find a total of twenty studies, excluding a review paper by Israely (1985) 
(Table 1).   Two papers that were initially included were later excluded because they 
actually sampled participants with specific learning difficulties rather than intellectual 
disabilities (Derr, 1986; Waterman, Sobesky, Silvern, Aoki, & McCaulay, 1981).  
Another paper was excluded (Boehm, 1966) because the findings relating to adolescents 
with IDs are published in more detail elsewhere (Boehm, 1967).  Very few studies took 
place before 1960, with the bulk of the literature being published between 1970 and 1989.  
All of the studies preceded the more recent theoretical progress within moral 
development theory, and comparison between studies was very difficult because of the 
use of many different unstandardised measures of moral reasoning.  There were no 
longitudinal studies examining Piagetian theory with people with IDs, while there were 
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eight studies making use of cross sectional group comparison methods, and two studies 
which employed a cross sectional single group method.  There were no qualitative studies 
examining Piagetian theory with this population.   Two longitudinal studies made use of 
.RKOEHUJ¶VRULJLQDOVFRULQJPHWKRGZKLOHILYHVWXGLHVGUHZXSRQ.RKOEHUJLDQmethods 
using cross sectional group comparison designs; one study made use of a cross sectional 
single group method.   There were no qualitative studies drawing upon Kohlbergian 
theory.  Finally, there were only two studies that did not adopt any theoretical perspective 
with regard to moral development.  The first was a cross sectional group study and the 
second was a qualitative study, although within this study some reference is made to 
Piaget and Kohlberg (Table 1). 
 
Piagetian Perspectives 
The studies adopting a Piagetian theoretical could be classified into two broad areas of 
research, 1) examination of the moral reasoning abilities of people with IDs, or 2) 
investigations of the factors associated with the moral reasoning abilities of people with 
IDs.    
 
Considering studies that attempted to examine the moral reasoning skills of people with 
IDs, one of the earliest studies we found investigated moral reasoning amongst young 
women with IDs living in institutions or the community and involved the use of Piagetian 
moral stories read to participants who were then asked a series of questions to elicit 
judgements (Abel, 1941). The author reported that the women within institutions engaged 
in moral realism by appealing to the consequences of the act depicted within the moral 
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story, rather than the intent of the actor, more often than women living within the 
community.  Abel (1941) found that this finding tended to be related to length of 
institutionalLVDWLRQDQGQRWµPHQWDODJH¶DQGIXUWKHUhypothesised that this was related to 
the social role taking opportunities within institutions; Abel (1941) pointed out that the 
inevitable focus on order and rules that accompany institutionalisation may have affected 
moral reasoning.    
 
The finding by Abel (1941) that young women with IDs tend to appeal to the 
consequences of an act, rather than intention or motive, is consistent with the findings of 
Foye and Simeonsson (1979).  They reported that adolescents (about 14 years old) and 
adults (about 26 years old) with IDs RIDVLPLODUµPHQWDODJH¶tended to appeal to the 
consequences of an act and the physical size of actors depicted in Piagetian stories more 
than intent, as compared to typically developing children around the age of 6 years.   
Blakey (1973) also reported findings that indicated that participants used physical 
consequences more often than intention when making judgements.  He reported no 
differences between typically developing children (about 6 years old) and adults with IDs 
(about 26 years old) matched for µmental age¶ on Piagetian moral stories with regards to 
whether moral judgements were based on intent, consequences or justice.  However, he 
also reported that performance on some stories was at chance levels suggesting that 
participants may have had difficulties comprehending the stories and completing the task 
presented to them.    
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The above findings are inconsistent with those of Bender (1980) who also used Piagetian 
stories to examine the moral judgement of children and adolescents with IDs (about 10 to 
16 years old) and typically developing children (about 8 years old).   Bender (1980) 
found that children and adolescents with IDs, as well as typically developing children, 
considered intent, more often than outcome, although there was some evidence that 
typically developing children considered intent more.   The most likely reason for the 
GLIIHUHQFHVLQ%HQGHU¶Vfindings is associated with the fact that she made use of 
typically developing children that were older.  However, the moral stories used were not 
presented in the paper, nor was reliability and validity data.  
 
The most recent study to consider moral reasoning amongst children with IDs aimed to 
examine the moral reasoning of children with autistic spectrum conditions.  Grant, 
Boucher, Riggs and Grayson (2005) presented comic book strips based on Piagetian 
stories to children with IDs, children with autistic spectrum conditions and typically 
developing children.  They aimed to examine differences between judgements regarding 
deliberate and accidental harm, and damage to people or objects.  They reported that all 
three groups of children were able to judge culpability on the basis of motive, and 
recognised that damage to people was more serious than damage to objects or property.  
The responses given by children with autistic spectrum conditions were more often 
unscorable,  The authors concluded that children with autistic spectrum conditions are 
able to make judgements that consider motive or intent, as opposed to outcome, and their 
abilities appeared similar to that of children with IDs.  However, neither of these groups 
performed as well as typically developing children, who were about four years younger 
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than the other groups, but matched in terms of their YHUEDO³PHQWDODJH´ which fell within 
WKH³DYHUDJH´UDQJH   
 
Another study that attempted to compare the moral reasoning ability of children with IDs 
to that of typically developing children went one step further and attempted to examine 
changes in moral maturity ZLWKLQFUHDVLQJµPHQWDODJH¶.  Lind and Smith (1984) used 
augmented Piagetian stories to examine the development of restitutive reasoning and 
cooperation in children with and wiWKRXW,'VVSUHDGDFURVVWKHµPHQWDODJHV¶RIILYHWR
nine.  The results indicated that there was a significant linear trend in moral reasoning 
VFRUHVDFURVVWKHµPHQWDODJHV¶DQGWKHUHZDVQRGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQW\SLFDOO\
developing children and children ZLWK,'VPDWFKHGRQµPHQWDODJH¶ZLWKUHVSHFWWRPRUDO
UHDVRQLQJZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIWKRVHPDWFKHGDWµPHQWDODJH¶VHYHQ&KLOGUHQZLWK,'V
VFRUHGKLJKHUWKDQW\SLFDOO\GHYHORSLQJFKLOGUHQDWµPHQWDODJH¶VHYHQDQGWKHDXWKRUV
suggested that this difference was not of significance, and may have been an anomaly 
associated with the participant sample.   
 
Four other studies using Piagetian assessment methods attempted to examine how factors 
VXFKDVµPHQWDODJH¶,4, or chronological age, along with other factors, were related to 
moral reasoning amongst people with IDs.  Two of these studies used cross-sectional 
group comparative designs (Gargiulo, 1984; Gargiulo & Sulick, 1978), while the other 
two made use of a single group design (Boehm, 1967; Ozbek & Forehand, 1973).     
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Gargiulo and Sulick (1978) set out to examine whether or not chronological age or 
cognitive ability (IQ) was related to moral reasoning.  They used modified Piagetian 
moral stories with typical developing children and children with IDs µHGXFDEOH¶ or more 
able, DQGµWUDLQDEOH¶ or less able children) aged six to 16 years. Their findings indicated 
that typically developing children scored higher on the moral reasoning task than children 
ZLWK,'VDQGµHGXFDEOH¶FKLOGUHQVFRUHGKLJKHUWKDQµWUDLQDEOH¶FKLOGUHQ7KHDXWKRUV
reported that IQ and chronological age accounted for 81% of the variance in moral 
reasoning scores, and they suggested that IQ and age may be independently related to 
moral reasoning.   
 
,Q*DUJLXOR¶VODWHUVWXG\again used augmented Piagetian stories, he set out to try 
WRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHURUQRWµUHIOHFWLYH¶RUµLPSXOVLYH¶FRJQLWLYHVW\OHs were related to 
moral reasoning in typically developing children and children with IDs matched on 
µPHQWDODJH¶3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHJURXSHGLQWRµUHIOHFWLYH¶RUµLPSXOVLYH¶JURXSVRQWKH
basis of response latency and number of errors associated with the completion of the 
Matching Familiar Figures Test.   The results indicated that children with IDs responded 
more quickly and made more errors although this was not significantly different from 
typically developing children, and similar numbers of children from each group were 
DVVLJQHGWRWKHµUHIOHFWLYH¶RUµLPSXOVLYH¶FDWHJRU\7KHUHZDVQRVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFH
between typically developing children and children with IDs, PDWFKHGRQµPHQWDODJH¶
with respect to moral reasoning.  +RZHYHUWKHµUHIOHFWLYH¶JURXSHYLGHQFHd significantly 
higher moral reasoning tKDQWKHµLPSXOVLYH¶JURXS*DUJLXOR also reported that age and 
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,4ZHUHQRWUHODWHGWRPRUDOUHDVRQLQJZKLOHµPHQWDODJH¶ZDVVLJQLILFDQWO\DVVRFLDWHG
with moral reasoning.   
 
The first study to make use of a single-group design was also the oldest papers found.  In 
an earlier study, Boehm (1966) commented that she originally used Piagetian stories to 
DVVHVVWKHPRUDOUHDVRQLQJRIFKLOGUHQLQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWXG\ZLWKWKHKHOSRI3LDJHW¶V
assistant in about 1936.  In 1967, she went on to publish a study where she administered 
Piagetian stories to adolescents with IDs in New York City, and compared her findings to 
previous studies using typically developing children. She did not find a relationship 
between age and IQ and performance on the moral stories when used with adolescents 
with IDs, and concluded that this was because of the nature of IDs found within her 
sample (Boehm, 1967).   
 
The final study making use of Piagetian theory attempted to examine whether 
chronoORJLFDODJHVH[µPHQWDODJH¶VRFLRHFRQRPLFVWDWXVDQGEHKDYLRXUZHUH
associated with the moral reasoning of young adolescents with IDs (Ozbek & Forehand, 
1973).   The authors reported that aggression, paternal education and chronological age 
significantly predicted moral reasoning, and with age being the best predictor.   However, 
it is important to note that the sample size used within this study is rather small (N=32), 
and complete data were available for only twenty-seven participants.  
 
Studies making use of Piagetian theory and assessment methods have tended to 
demonstrate that the moral reasoning of people with IDs develops at a slower pace than 
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that of typically developing children, and developmental differences tend to disappear 
when groups are matched on DPHDVXUHRIµPHQWDODJH¶Studies that have made use of 
typically developing children around the age of six years, matched to people with IDs 
with a VLPLODU³PHQWDODJH´ have demonstrated that people with IDs had difficulties 
engaging in moral reasoning that considered motive or intent, and these participants 
tended to appeal to the consequences of an act when making judgements (Abel, 1941; 
Blakey, 1973; Foye & Simeonsson, 1979).  People with IDs matched to older children 
around the age of eight years evidenced moral reasoning that considered motive more 
frequently (Bender, 1980; Grant, Boucher, Riggs, & Grayson, 2005), and one study 
demonstrated that moral development may take a linear form amongst people with IDs 
DQGW\SLFDOO\GHYHORSLQJFKLOGUHQVSUHDGDFURVVWKHµPHQWDODJHV¶RIILYHWRQLQH(Lind & 
Smith, 1984)2WKHUVWXGLHVKDYHGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWYDULDEOHVVXFKDV,4µPHQWDODJH¶
behaviour, chronological age and a µUHIOHFWLYH¶FRJQLWLYH style are associated with moral 




There were a total of eight studies found that have adopted a Kohlbergian approach to the 
assessment and formulation of moral reasoning amongst people with IDs.  These studies 
can be classified into 1) longitudinal studies that aimed to explore moral development 
and conduct in children and adolescents with IDs, and 2) cross sectional studies that 
aimed to explore factors associated with moral reasoning amongst people with IDs.  
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Considering longitudinal design methodologies first, Beth Stephens and her colleagues at 
Temple University in Philadelphia undertook a large research project examining the 
development of logical reasoning skills in people with IDs.  As part of this work, 
Mahaney & Stephens (1974) investigated the development of moral reasoning 
longitudinally amongst three age groups of children and adolescents with and without IDs 
(ages six to 10, 10 to 14 and 14 to 18)PDNLQJXVHRI.RKOEHUJ¶VHDUOLHUFRQWHQWDQDO\VLV
based scoring system. At the same time, using the same sample and longitudinal design, 
Moore & Stephens (1974) investigated the development of moral conduct.    
 
Mahaney & Stephens (1974) developed a set of stories based around the concepts of 
lying, justice, punishment, collective responsibility, clumsiness, stealing and rules.  They 
mostly presented stories, supported by pictures, and asked participants to make choices 
regarding appropriate and inappropriate behaviour or decisions, but for the assessment of 
the understanding of rules, the experimenter and the participant played a game of 
bowling. The participant was asked a series of questions regarding rules relating to the 
game in order to assess his or her  ³FRQFHSWLRQV of the origin, divinity and heteronomy of 
UXOHV´ (p. 134, Mahaney & Stephens, 1974).  Responses to the stories and questions were 
coded, using what appears to be .RKOEHUJ¶VHDUO\ content-analysis approach, with regards 
to lying, justice and clumsiness and stealing.  One hundred and fifty children and 
adolescents were included, divided into equal groups of those with, and without IDs.  
During the first phase of the study, significant differences between the two groups of 
participants were found on most variables.  Comparisons across age-groups revealed 
developmental increases for children with and without IDs, although the oldest group of 
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participants with IDs (aged 14 to 18) did not perform better than they younger peers 
(aged 10 to 14). Mahaney and Stephens (1974) suggested that moral development may 
reach a ceiling for this population.  Examination of their longitudinal data during the 
second phase of their study revealed that moral development, as indexed by a significant 
difference over time, was noted for the participants without IDs, although some reversal 
was detected.  Similar differences over time were found regarding moral development of 
participants with IDs, but these increases were not as marked, and some of them did not 
reach statistical significance.  There was again some evidence of reversal.  The 
longitudinal data refuted the suggestion that moral development of young people with 
IDs is static during the ages of 14 to 18, although the extent of the development may not 
be as marked or as consistent as that of their typically developing peers.  
 
0RRUH	6WHSKHQV¶ study focused on the deYHORSPHQWRIµPRUDOEHKDYLRXU¶, not 
simply on cognition.   A series of structured situations were devised in which each 
participant took part while their behaviour was observed.   Situations were classed into 
those that aimed to assess self-control, honesty, stealing, mishaps, cheating and 
persistence.  For example, one situation assessed a mishap where the participant was left 
in a room by an experimenter. Another experimenter entered the room to collect some 
papers, and took the clock as they left. The first experimenter then returned and asked the 
participant if they knew anything about the missing clock.   
 
The cross sectional data from the first phase of the study demonstrated a developmental 
progression in the moral conduct across groups of participants.  The moral conduct scores 
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of people with IDs were lower than for those without IDs, but this difference disappeared 
ZKHQSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHPDWFKHGDFFRUGLQJWRµPHQWDODJH¶.  Examination of the 
longitudinal data during the second phase of the study demonstrated a developmental 
improvement for people with and without IDs, but there was some deterioration in moral 
conduct scores for adolescents with IDs aged between 12-16 years over time. This 
deterioration did not occur for adolescents without IDs.    
 
McLaughlin & Stephens (1974) attempted to integrate the findings from the two studies 
(Mahaney & Stephens, 1974; Moore & Stephens, 1974) by undertaking a factor analysis 
of the data generated during the various phases of their studies.   A positive relationship 
was found between moral conduct and moral reasoning.  This relationship strengthened 
across the longitudinal aspect of their studies.  However, limited information was 
presented on how this factor analysis was completed, and as a consequence, caution is 
recommended regarding the conclusions drawn from this analysis.   
 
Some important conclusions can be drawn from these studies. First, there is development 
in both moral reasoning and moral conduct amongst children and adolescents with IDs.  
Secondly, while moral conduct seems similar amongst children and adolescents with IDs 
compared to their SHHUVRIDVLPLODUµPHQWDODJH¶WKLVLVQRWHQWLUHO\WKHFDVHIRUPRUDO
reasoning.  Thirdly, the developmental trend appears to be attenuated for children and 
adolescents with IDs.  Fourthly, there may be some periods of reversal amongst children 
and adolescents with IDs as well as their same age peers.  Finally, there appears to be a 
relationship between moral reasoning and moral conduct amongst children and 
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adolescents with and without IDs.   However, it must be noted that these studies made use 
of an early YHUVLRQRI.RKOEHUJ¶VVFRULQJV\VWHPZKLFKZDVQRWVWDQGDUGLVHGDQGZDV
used with techniques to assess moral reasoning that are of unknown validity and 
reliability.  
 
Moving on to consider studies making use of Kolbergian scoring techniques that have 
employed a cross sectional group comparison method, these tend to have focused on 
whether or not chronological age, as well as mental age, is related to moral reasoning 
amongst people with IDs.  Theories of moral development state that social role taking 
opportunities are required in order for individuals to progress through the stages of moral 
development, and this is preceded by cognitive development (Gibbs, 1979, 2003, 2010; 
Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1932).  As age increases, opportunities and experiences 
with social role conflict around moral choice and decision within peer groups also 
increase, resulting in learning. Chronological age is therefore considered to be an index, 
albeit flawed, of social role taking opportunity.   
 
In order to examine the relationship between age, µPHQWDODJH¶DQGPRUDOUHDVRQLQJ
Taylor & Achenbach (1975) matched older children with IDs to younger typically 
GHYHORSLQJFKLOGUHQVSUHDGDFURVVWKUHHOHYHOVRIµPHQWDODJH¶\HDUV\HDUVDQG 
years.  They reported a significant relationship between moral rHDVRQLQJDQGµPHQWDO
DJH¶LQFRQWUDVW IQ and chronological age were not related to moral reasoning.  Taylor & 
Achenbach (1975) suggested that their study contradicts the proposed relationship 
between chronological age and moral reasoning.  Similar results were reported by Kahn 
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(1976) who reported no relationship between chronological age and moral reasoning 
amongst people with IDs.  He matched young adults with moderate IDs to children with 
mild IDs, and typically developing childrenRQWKHEDVLVRIµPHQWDODJH¶DQGused 
.RKOEHUJ¶VVFRULQJV\VWHP. On the measure of moral reasoning, young adults with 
moderate IDs performed significantly worse than the typically developing children, while 
the children with mild IDs did not differ from either of the other two groups.  
Considering that typically developing children and children with mild IDs differed in 
chronological age, but not mental age or moral reasoning ability, he concluded that there 
was no support for a relationship between chronological age and moral reasoning.   
However, there was a significant positive correlation between chronological age and 
moral reasoning for the entire sample, contradicting his assertion that chronological age 
was not related to moral development.   
 
Kahn (1983) went on to complete another study where he concluded that moral reasoning 
is not related to chronological age, but is significantly associated with cognitive ability, 
as measured by a series of logical reasoning tasks, anGµPHQWDODJH¶7KHUHODWLRQVKLS
between performance on the logical reasoning tasks and moral reasoning was stronger 
WKDQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKµPHQWDODJH¶.  He reported similar findings in a later study, and 
also reported that the moral reasoning abilities of typically developing children were 
significantly higher than adolescents with moderate IDs, but not any different from those 
with mild IDs (Kahn, 1985).   
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Only one other study was found that used a cross-sectional group comparative design and 
made use of a Kohlbergian scoring system.  Miller, Zumoff and Stephens (1974) 
examined the moral reasoning of three groups of participants: adolescent girls with a 
KLVWRU\RIµGHOLQTXHQF\¶DQGDGROHVFHQWJLUOVZLth and without IDs and no such history. 
$VHWRIPRUDOWDVNVZDVXVHGWKDWDLPHGWRDVVHVVWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶YLHZVRIFRQVWUXFWV
such as justice, punishment, responsibility and lying, and was scored usinJ.RKOEHUJ¶V
content-analysis approach.   While the typically developing adolescents, with no history 
RISUREOHPVGLGQRWSHUIRUPDQ\EHWWHUWKDQWKHLUµGHOLQTXHQW¶SHHUVWKHµGHOLQTXHQW¶
adolescents performed significantly better than adolescents with IDs on some, but not all, 
the tasks.  It was noted that girls with IDs tended to appeal to the consequences of an act 
when making moral judgements, and it was concluded that moral reasoning and moral 
behaviour may be unrelated.   Unfortunately, this study did not include any participants 
with IDs and behavioural problems.  Moreover, the reliability and validity of the methods 
used to assess moral reasoning are questionable.  
 
The final study found making use of Kohlbergian scoring methods used a single group 
cross sectional design.  Sigman, Ungerer & Russell (1983) recruited a small sample of 
adolescents from an inpatient ward for people with behavioural and developmental 
delays.  The mean Full Scale IQ of the sample was 70.2, indicating that at least some of 
the participants had IDs.  This is the only study we could find that attempted to use a 
standardised procedure for eliciting and scoring moral judgement with a group where 
some of the SDUWLFLSDQWVKDG,'V6WRULHVIURP.RKOEHUJ¶V6WDQGDUG6FRULQJ0DQXDO
(Sigman et al., 1983) were used to measure moral reasoning, while the Test of Social 
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Inference  (Edmonson, de Jung, Leland, & Leach, 1966) was used to examine social 
problem solving and social acceptance.  An assessment of the principle of conservation 
was also employed with the RULJLQDOWHDFKHUUDWLQJTXHVWLRQQDLUHRIWKH&RQQHUV¶5DWLQJ
Scale (Conners, 1969).   The authors did not find any relationship between moral 
UHDVRQLQJDQGµPHQWDODJH¶RUIQ.   Ability to understand social situations and 
conservation skills was not related to moral reasoning, but there was a significant 
relationship between moral reasoning and behavioural difficulties.  Participants who 




There were two studies found that did not draw on any specific theoretical perspective 
with respect to the assessment or scoring of moral reasoning ability.  The first made use 
of a cross-sectional group comparative methodology, where participants matched for 
µPHQWDODJH¶completed the Jackson Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test.  In this task, 
participants were read a story about being tempted to steal and then asked what they think 
they would and should do in that situation (Jackson & Haines, 1982)7KH³VKRXOG´
statement was meant to elicit what a participant believed is morally right in the situation.  
It was found that typically developing girls said they would have resisted stealing 
significantly more than girls with IDs, although there was no difference for boys.   
Jackson and Haines (1982) reported no difference between younger typically developing 
children and older children with IDs with respect to their UHSRUWRIZKDWWKH\³VKRXOGGR´
While acknowledging their limitations in terms of the validity of their assessments, 
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Jackson & Haines (1982) considered that the FKLOGUHQ¶VDFFRXQWVZHUHUHODWHGWRWKHLU
moral judgements, suggesting the groups were similar with respect to their moral 
reasoning, or moral judgement 
 
The second study involved a qualitative approach to the assessment of moral reasoning 
amongst children with IDs of differing ages. Petrovich (1982) recruited school children 
(55% male) with mild IDs (aged nine to 17) from two cities in what is now Serbia.   Each 
participant was interviewed and asked to judge their own behaviour, elicited through a 
VHULHVRITXHVWLRQVVXFKDV³:KDWGR\RXWKLQNLVWKHEHVWWKLQJ\RXKDYHHYHUGRQH"´
Responses were subjected to a thematic analysis by different raters.  The author 
suggested that there was no gender dLIIHUHQFHEXWQRWHGWKDW\RXQJHUJLUOVJDYH³KHOSLQJ
RWKHUV´DVDMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKHLUEHKDYLRXUPRUHRIWHQWKDQGLG\RXQJHUER\V7KHUH
was also a bias noted toward the recall of bad actions rather than good actions, which the 
author suggested was related to a bias to pay attention to negative events as part of the 
socialisation of children.   It was also noted that some children were unable to answer 
some of the questions. This was thought to reflect limitations in their expressive 
vocabulary, but it was also noted that this reticence occurred more frequently to questions 
about inappropriate, rather than appropriate, behaviour. Petrovich (1982) also reported 
some developmental trends with respect to the answers the children gave.  She reported 
that the categories generated by younger children related to rule-governed behaviour, 
while older children appealed to the idea of helping others, emotion, norms, reciprocity, 
DQGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI³SRVLWLYHSHUVRQDOLW\FKDUDFWHULVWLFV´$OWKRXJK3HWURYLFK
(1982) did not draw parallels with moral development theory, the categories elicited by 
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the younger participants appear to relate to preconventional moral reasoning, while there 
are elements of conventional reasoning within the ROGHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FDWHJRULHV  
 
Moral Development 25 
 
Discussion 
The literature reviewed in this paper is problematic and generates more questions than 
answers.  However, some tentative conclusions can be drawn.  First, the studies suggest 
that the moral development of children, adolescents and adults with IDs is attenuated in 
comparison to same-age matched peers, but this difference tends to disappear if people 
ZLWK,'VDUHPDWFKHGWRW\SLFDOO\GHYHORSLQJFKLOGUHQRQDPHDVXUHRIµPHQWDODJH¶7KLV
highlights the important role cognitive ability has with respect to moral development.   
Second, the longitudinal studies of Beth Stephens and her colleagues (Mahaney & 
Stephens, 1974; Moore & Stephens, 1974; Stephens & McLaughlin, 1974) demonstrate 
that the moral development of children and adolescents with IDs does progress, but in an 
slower manner, in comparison to typically developing peers.  Furthermore, these authors 
demonstrated that the moral development of older adolescents with IDs does not reach a 
ceiling and does continue with increasing age.  Unfortunately, the scoring method 
employed within these studies DSSHDUVWREH.RKOEHUJ¶V(1968) content-analysis 
approach.  This has been criticised, and Snarey (1985), in his review of the moral 
reasoning literature, assigned articles using this approach WRD³FDXWLRQ´ category because 
of the difficulties with subjectivity and unreliability.   Nevertheless, Lind and Smith 
(1984), using a different method, similarly demonstrated that moral development in 
children and adolescents with ID is attenuated, but occurs in a linear manner.  
 
The third conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that moral reasoning is 
related to behaviour amongst people with IDs (Moore & Stephens, 1974; Sigman et al., 
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1983).  Finally, there appears to be some evidencHWKDWDPHDVXUHRIµPHQWDODJH¶DV
opposed to chronological age, is positively related to moral development.  Given that the 
participants included in the studies had IDs, which would have affected the expected 
relationship between moral development and chronological age, this finding is not 
surprising.  
 
As noted, there are significant problems with the studies included within this review. 
First, none consider the relationship between language ability and performance on 
measures of moral reasoning.  This is problematic because many of the differences 
between the groups, in terms of moral reasoning ability, may reflect differences in 
language ability.  Second, many VWXGLHVXVHGµPHQWDODJH¶DVDQLQGH[RIFRJQLWLYH
functioning and this is sometimes misconstrued as an index of maturity. Cognitive 
development does not continue through-out life in a more or less linear fashion as would 
be suggested by the FRQFHSWRIµPHQWDODJH¶Hence, it is inappropriate to suggest that 
adults with IDs are similar to typically developing children using an index such as 
µPHQWDODJH¶. It would be more appropriate to use a standardised psychometric instrument 
of intellectual functioning.  
 
Third, the studies reviewed used different measures of moral reasoning, which are un-
standardised and idiosyncratic.  Reliability and validity data regarding for these measures 
is absent, and this makes the interpretation of findings problematic.  Moreover, many of 
the measures used within studies do not relate well to theory, and as a consequence, this 
limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the moral development of people with IDs. 
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Fourth, the participants are not thoroughly described in any of the papers.  There is a 
general assumption that people with IDs are a homogenous group; this is far from the 
case.  There is the possibility that moral development may vary with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities of different aetiologies.  For example, children and adolescents 
with autistic spectrum conditions may have specific difficulties with social-perspective 
taking, which may have an affect upon their moral reasoning and development.   Drawing 
firm conclusions from the literature included in this review is complicated because people 
with IDs are treated as a homogenous group, as well as the fact that conceptions of moral 
reasoning, IDs and the measurement of intelligence have changed over time. 
 
The idea that development may be affected by intellectual and developmental disabilities 
of differing aetiologies is not a novel idea.  Inhelder (1966) espoused the view the 
development of children with IDs is equivalent to children without intellectual 
disabilities, but occurs at a slower rate.   Zigler (1969) supported this view and proposed 
that the development of people with IDs ZKRVHGLVDELOLWLHVDUHRIµFXOWXUDO-familiaO¶
DHWLRORJ\DVRSSRVHGWRµRUJDQLF¶DHWLRORJ\VKRXOGEHVLPLODUWRµmental age¶-matched 
peers.   The view adopted here is that development in people with IDs of genetic, 
teratogenic, or injurious aetiologies is likely to be dissimilar to typically developing 
peers.  Development occurring amongst people with IDs of socio-environmental 
aetiologies (e.g. poverty) is likely to be similar to typically developing peers, but the 
development may be slower.  This view has been called the µsimilar-sequence 
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hypothesis¶ (Weisz & Zigler, 1979), and underpinned many of the studies included within 
this review.     
 
The final criticism of these studies is that the focus of many of these studies was narrow 
in the sense that they attempted to simply describe the moral reasoning of children, 
adolescents or adults with IDs and compare this with that of typically developing 
children.  Even with this goal, very few of the studies actually reported the moral 
reasoning stage of their samples, and this no doubt relates to the use of measures that are 
unstandardised or idiosyncratic.   Bearing the difficulties already discussed, two studies 
that did report moral stage found that the majority of their participants were scoring at 
preconventional levels, with very few participants scoring at more advanced levels 
(Sigman et al., 1983; Taylor & Achenbach, 1975).   
 
The absence of reliable and valid measures of moral reasoning for use with people who 
have IDs is of concern, particularly as it has received little attention within the literature. 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of measures that are currently used to assess moral 
reasoning.  The first are referred to as recognition instruments. These provide a set of 
moral justifications, traditionally following the presentation of a moral dilemma, after 
which participants are asked to select the justification that best matches their own 
reasoning.  The second group of instruments are referred to as production instruments. 
These require participants to verbalise their own moral reasoning in response to questions 
aimed at eliciting these judgements.  Given that many people with IDs may have 
communication difficulties, recognition instruments of moral reasoning, where a 
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participant is given a set of moral justifications and asked to choose one, may be of 
greater utility with this population because they may be easier to understand.  
 
However, many recognition instruments do not measure the developmentally younger 
stages of moral reasoning which may be more relevant to  people with IDs (Rest, 1979; 
Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999) and they do not discriminate reliably between 
offender and non-offender groups, drawing their validity into question (Basinger & 
Gibbs, 1987; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983; Gibbs et al., 1984; Stams et al., 2006).  
In contrast, a difference between such groups has been more often reported when 
production instruments are used (Basinger, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1995; Gavaghan et al., 1983; 
Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby, 1982; Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 
1998; Palmer & Hollin, 2000).  There is scope in considering whether or not The 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure ± Short Form (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992), which is 
a modern production instrument of moral reasoning, can be used with people who have 
IDs, as this measure has been successfully used with young children (Gibbs et al., 2007) 
and can be administered as an interview, negating the need for reading and writing.   
 
The SRM-SF is linked to a cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning (Gibbs, 
2003, 2010), and there are theoretical approaches to moral development which have not 
been considered within the literature included within this review.  For example, according 
to TurieO¶V(1983, 2002) social domain theory, there are social conventional rules that do 
not cause intrinsic harm when violated, and there are moral rules which do cause harm to 
individuals when they are violated.  In contrast to Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1958, 1969; 
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Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969), moral development and social-conventional development are 
separated, and morality is seen as the system of rules and conventions governing harm, 
trust, justice and rights, while social conventions are the rules that govern social systems 
and appropriate behaviour (Semetana, 1999).  Other approaches include Gilligan (1982) 
ZKRDUJXHGWKDW.RKOEHUJ¶VDSSURDFKZDVVH[LVWEHFDXVHLWGLGQRWFRQVLGHUappropriately 
moral judgements based on care and relationships, which Gilligan (1982) considered to 
be prevalent amongst women.   Eisenberg (1989) considers both justice and care-based 
moral reasoning within a model where a central role is given to empathy in helping to 
determine prosocial behaviour, while Hoffman (2000) also gives empathy centre-stage 
with respect to moral reasoning.  None of these theoretical approaches to understanding 
moral development and behaviour has been examined with people who have IDs, and 
there is a need for further research within this area.  
 
It is also important to consider the socio-political context in which many of the studies 
reviewed were undertaken.  In the United Kingdom, many people with IDs were placed 
within institutions.  For example, in the United Kingdom from 1914 to 1948 (excluding 
1939 to 1945), more than 5693 men and women with IDs were confined to hospital using 
the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 (Walker & McCabe, 1973), and people with IDs did 
not have a right to education until 1970, with the introduction of the Education Act 1970.  
In the United States, many people with IDs were also forced to live within institutions 
(Trent, 1994), and they were not given the right to education until 1975, with the 
introduction of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 1975.   Discrimination 
against all people on the basis of disability was eventually prohibited in the United States 
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with the introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, and the effectiveness 
of this Act is uncertain.      
 
The bulk of the studies reviewed took place during a period when many people with IDs 
did not have the right to education and many would have been living in settings that are 
different from those used today.   Given that social perspective taking is linked to moral 
development, institutionalisation and a lack of education may have had an impact upon 
the moral development of this population, and this may have affected the findings of the 
studies within the current review.   Today in the United Kingdom, almost all of the state-
run large institutions for people with IDs have closed, and the introduction of the 
Community Care Act 1990, and other legislation, such as the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 (revised in 2005), and the Human Rights Act 1998 have gone some way to 
promoting community living for people with IDs.  The government has developed 
specific policies to encourage the social inclusion of people with IDs (Department of 
Health, 2001, 2007) through WKHSURPRWLRQRIDµFLWL]HQVKLS¶DJHQGDZKLFKDWWHPSWVWR
address barriers that deny people with IDs full citizenship.    Other pieces of legislation 
exist within the United States which attempt to help ensure that all people with 
disabilities have similar rights to those without disabilities (e.g. Voting Accessibility for 
the Elderly and Handicapped Act 1984; Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
1997).  TKH3UHVLGHQW¶V&RPPLWWHHIRU3HRSOHZLWK,QWHOOHFWXDO'LVDELOLWLHVLQWKH8QLWHG
States functions to promote a citizenship agenda for people with IDs by helping to advise 
the President on issues such as employment, housing, and community living in relation to 
people with IDs.    
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As a consequence, the lives of people with IDs have changed dramatically in comparison 
to the time period when many of the studies undertaken within the current review took 
place.  People with IDs are likely to have different social-perspective taking opportunities 
which may have an impact upon moral development.  However, no attention has been 
paid to this within the literature, and further studies of the moral development of people 
with IDs are needed.  
 
In conclusion, research into the moral development of people with IDs is needed given 
that there have been several theoretical developments within the field.  Gibbs (2003, 
2010) KDVUHYLVHG.RKOEHUJ¶V(Kohlberg, 1958, 1969, 1976) traditional stage theory of 
moral development, embracing information processing theory and incorporating aspects 
RI+RIIPDQ¶V(Hoffman, 2000) developmental approach which pinpoints empathy as 
relevant to the process of moral development and reasoning.  Many of the studies 
included in the current review actually predate many of the theoretical developments of 
Lawrence Kohlberg, let alone John Gibbs or Martin Hoffman or many of the other 
theorists in the area.  The studies that have been completed are often poorly designed and 
make use of measures of moral reasoning that are unreliable and lack validity.  
 
Further studies in this area as also needed, considering that there has been marked interest 
in the relationship between moral reasoning and offending behaviour (Blasi, 1980; 
Nelson et al., 1990; Stams et al., 2006).  However, little to nothing is known about the 
relationship between anti-social behaviour and moral reasoning amongst children, 
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adolescents or adults with IDs (Langdon, Clare, & Murphy, in press).  There is reason to 
explore this relationship given that there is evidence that psychological interventions 
drawn from moral development theory, in combination with other interventions, are 
effective (Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993).  There are further issues here which also need 
to be investigated.  Specifically, interventions drawing upon moral reasoning theory such 
as EQUIP (Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995) aim to encourage developmental increases 
in moral judgement, and people with IDs may have difficulty reaching the 
developmentally higher moral reasoning stages which may protect against anti-social 
behaviour.  This poses a difficulty with respect to the utility of these interventions with 
this population, and once again we are faced with more questions than answers.  
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Table 1: Studies examining the moral reasoning abilities of people with intellectual disabilities.  Studies were grouped according to 
theoretical perspective (Piaget, Kohlberg or other), and then ordered according to methodology as follows:  longitudinal studies, cross 
sectional studies with groups matched on some variables, cross sectional studies with only one group, and qualitative studies.  
(Acronyms: MA=¶Mental Age¶; CA=Chronological Age; IDs=Intellectual Disabilities; SES=Socio-Economic Status) 
 
 
 Study Country Sample Matching & 
Selection 














matched for CA, 
MA and SES in 
some instances..  
1. Women with IDs aged 15 to 21 (MA 6 to 11) 
sampled from either institutions (N=20) or trade 
adjustment classes (N=20).   
2. Women with IDs who had been in institutions for 
less than one year (N=15) compared to women who 
had been in institutions for over six years (N=15).  
3.  Women with IDs of MA 6-8 (N=28) or MA 9-11 
(N=29).  
1. Unstandardised 
moral stories.  
1. Institutionalised girls endorsed punitive 
consequences of inappropriate behaviour more 
frequently and tended to appeal to outcome rather 
than intent.  
2. Reduction in egocentric moral justification 
UHODWHGWRLQFUHDVLQJµPHQWDODJH¶ 
 Bender (1980) 
 
United States N=42  1. Unable to 
complete 
Piagetian tasks 
of conservation.  
1. Children of normal intelligence (M age=94.7 
months). 
³(GXFDEOHPHQWDOO\UHWDUGHG´FKLOGUHQM age 
=117.7; M IQ=62). 
³7UDLQDEOHPHQWDOO\UHWDUGHG´DGROHVFHQWVM age 




regarding a lost child 
and an older child 
who helps this lost 
child.  Stories varied 
according to outcome 
and intent. Subjects 
were asked to award 
chocolate to the child 
after the story based 
on helpfulness.  
1. All children tended to consider intention, rather 
than outcome.  
2. Children with IDs tended to award chocolate 
more often than children without IDs when the 
intention was positive and the outcome was 
negative.  
3. Typically developing children rewarded fewest 
chocolate when intent was negative and outcome 
was negative.  
 Blakey (1973) 
 
Scotland N=40 1. Sex 
2. MA 
1. Adults with IDs (Median age =26 years; Median 
MA=6 years). 
2. Children without IDs (Median age =6 years) 
1. Unstandardised 
moral stories 
developed to examine 
whether the 




1. No difference between IDs and Non-IDs 
groups.  Author concluded that this was because 
they were matched on MA.  Participants appealed 
to consequences more than actor intent.  
2. Girls and women tended to endorse more 
severe punishments for transgressions.  Author 
suspects that this is because many stories 
depicted boys as characters.  
3. Respondents performance was at chance levels 
on some stories.  




United States N=60 1. Sex (equal 
numbers of 
males and 
females in all 
1. Adolescents with mild IDs (M age =171.65 
months; M MA=87.95 months; M IQ=61.15). 
2. Adults with moderate IDs (M age =316.35 months; 




slides and audio 
1. No overall differences between the groups.  
Participants tended to appeal to consequences 
more than intent.  
2. However, adults with IDs rated negative intent 
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 groups).  3. Children with No-IDs (M age =77.45 months; M 
MA=85.65 months; M IQ=106.90) 
which varied 
according to actor 
size, intention, and 
consequences.  
2. Three additional 
unstandardised moral 
stories assessing 
authority, peer and 
altruistic moral 
perspectives.  
more positively than adolescents with IDs and 
children without IDs, and also rated smaller 
actors more positively than larger actors.  
 Gargiulo (1984) 
 





2. Matched on 
µPHQWDODJH¶ 
1. Children with IDs (M age =10.10; M IQ=62.58) 
2. Children with no-IDs (M age=6.52; M IQ=109.38)  




stories based on 
Piagetian stories 
(Boeham, 1967) 
1. No difference between groups on moral 
reasoning measure.  
2. No relationship with moral reasoning and IQ 
detected.  
3. No difference in accuracy or time to respond 
amongst the groups.  
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHJURXSHGLQWR³UHIOHFWLYH´DQG
³LPSXOVLYH´groups according to accuracy.  
³5HIOHFWLYH´SDUWLFLSDQWVHYLGHQFHGKLJKHUPRUDO
reasoning.  
 Gargiulo & 
Sulick (1978) 




were placed into 
age bands: 6 to 
10; 11 to 13; and 
14 to 16. 
1. Children and adolescents with no-IDs (Age range 




mentally retarded (Age range 6 to 16; IQ=25-50) 
1. Unstandardisded 
moral judgement 
stories based on 
Piagetian stories 
(Boeham, 1967) 
1. Significant difference between groups; 
Participants without IDs scored higher than 
SDUWLFLSDQWVZLWK,'VDQG³HGXFDEOH´SDUWLFLSDQWV
VFRUHGKLJKHUWKDQ³WUDLQDEOHSDUWLFLSDQWV´ 
2. Positive relationship between moral judgement 
and CA.  
3. No relationship between IQ and CA.  IQ and 
CA accounted for 81% of variance in moral 
judgement scores.  
 
 Grant, Boucher, 
Riggs & Grayson 
(2005) 






1. Children with mild IDs (M age =153.76 months; M 
MA=94.35 months; M VIQ=66.65). 
2. Children with autism (M age =146.4 months; M 
MA=102.50 months; M IQ=74.18). 
2. Children with no-IDs (M age =100.85 months; M 
MA=99.22 months; M IQ=99.45) 
1. Six stories with 
comic strips adapted 
from Elkind & Dabek 
(1977) which are 
based on Piagetian 
stories.  
1. All groups able to judge culpability. 
2. Damage to people judged as more serious than 
damage to objects by all participants.  




 Lind & Smith 
(1984) 








Both gURXSVVSUHDGDFURVVµPHQWDODJH¶RI 5-9 years. 
1. Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale 
2. Slosson Intelligence 
Test 
3. Modified Piagetian 
Moral Stories  
4. Marble Pull 
Apparatus (Madsen & 
Connor, 1973) used to 
1. No moral judgement differences between 
groups matched on MA (with the exception that 
³HGXFDEOHPHQWDOO\UHWDUGHGFKLOGUHQ´DW0$
scored higher than typically developing children; 
the authors thought this finding was difficult to 
interpret).  
2. Developmental linear trend in moral judgement 
for both groups.  
³(GXFDEOH0HQWDOO\5HWDUGHG´FKLOGUHQscored 
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1. People with IQ=50 to 69 aged 16 to 20 (M age 
=18.0 M IQ=61.0) sampled from high schools in 
New York City or an Occupational Training Centre.  
1. Modified Piagetian 
Moral Stories  
1. Those attending the training centre had 
difficulties giving answers.  Comparisons are 
made with a sample of typically developing 
children within the results section, although this 
sample is not described elsewhere.  
2. No relationship between moral responses and 
age or IQ detected.  
3. No trends across age groups found.  
 Ozbek & 
Forehand (1973) 
 





M age =155.3 months 
M MA =88.6 months 
M IQ =58.9 months 
0LVVRXUL&KLOGUHQ¶V
Behaviour Checklist 
2. Piagetian Stories 
presented using films  
1. Positive correlation between moral judgement 
and CA or MA.  Negative correlation with 
paternal education and occupation.  
2. Regression equations predicting moral 
judgement demonstrated that aggression, paternal 
education, and CA were significant predictors.   
3. Authors conclude that CA is best predictor of 














1. Children and adolescents with No-IDs (IQ =90-
110) split across three age groups (6 to 10; 10 to 14; 
14 to 18 years) 
2. Children and adolescents with IDs (IQ =90-110) 
split across three age groups (6 to 10; 10 to 14; 14 to 
18 years) 
 
1. Moral stories 
making use of a 
scoring method 
developed by 
Kohlberg in his PhD 
thesis.  
1. Significant differences between participants 
with IDs and no-IDs. 
2. Relationship between CA and moral reasoning 
reported for both participants with IDs and no-
IDs.   
3. Significant increases in performance with time 
for participants with IDs and no-IDs, but some 
reversal noted.   Development not as marked or 
consistent for participants with IDs 
 Moore & 
Stephens (1974) 








1. Children and adolescents with No-IDs (IQ =90-
110) split across three age groups (6 to 10; 10 to 14; 
14 to 18 years) 
2. Children and adolescents with IDs (IQ =90-110) 
split across three age groups (6 to 10; 10 to 14; 14 to 
18 years) 
 
1. A structured 
situation was devised 
ZKHUHSDUWLFLSDQW¶V
behaviour was 
observed in order to 
assess moral conduct 
across dimensions of 
honesty, self-control, 
cheating etc.  
1. Negative correlation between age and 
misconduct score suggesting a developmental 
improvement in conduct.   
2. Misconduct scores higher for participants with 
IDs in comparison to those with no-IDs, and this 
difference partially disappeared when MA was 
controlled.   When MA and CA controlled 
differences between groups remained during 
initial assessment period, but differences 
disappeared when participants assessed two years 
later.  
3. Significant decrease in misconduct score over 
time for all groups except IDs group aged 12-16 
at second assessment phase (two years later); 













1. Children with mild IDs (M age =128 months; M 
MA=90 months; M IQ=66). 
2. Adolescents with moderate IDs (M age =218 
months; M MA=88 months; M IQ=45). 
2. Children with no-IDs (M age =83 months; M 
1. Piagetian tasks. 
2. Moral Reasoning 
Stories based on 
.RKOEHUJ¶VZRUN- five 
stories with questions 
1. Children with no-IDs significantly higher on 
moral reasoning than adolescents with moderate 
IDs.  No difference between children with no-ID 
and mild IDs, and children with mild IDs and 
adolescents with moderate IDs.  
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sampled.  MA=87 months; M IQ=101).   to elicit moral 
judgement (Porter & 
Taylor, 1972) 
2. Significant positive correlation between moral 
reasoning and cognitive functioning and MA. 
3. Significant positive correlation between CA 
and moral reasoning.  
 Kahn (1983) 
 





3. All male.  
4. SES 
1. Adolescents with moderate IDs with organic 
aetiology (M age =238.95 months; M MA=82.84 
months; M IQ=43.11). 
2. Children with mild IDs with organic abnormality 
(M age =127.16 months; M MA=84.16 months; M 
IQ=65.95).  
3. Children with mild IDs with no known organic 
abnormality (M age =124.26 months; M MA=81.37 
months; M IQ=65.32).  
4. Children with no-IDs  (M age =82.47 months; M 
MA=84.89 months; M IQ=103.26) 
 
1. Piagetian tasks 
2. Moral Reasoning 
Stories based on 
.RKOEHUJ¶VZRUN- five 
stories with questions 
to elicit moral 
judgement (Porter & 
Taylor, 1972) 
1. Children with no-IDs had higher moral 
reasoning than adolescents with moderate IDs.   
2. IQ and MA significantly associated with moral 
reasoning score.  
3. No relationship between CA and moral 
reasoning.  
4. Author concludes that CA is not related to 
moral reasoning amongst participants with IDs.  
 
 Kahn (1985) United States N=80 1. All male. 
2. MA 
 
1. Adolescents with moderate IDs (M age =19 years 
and.10 months; M MA=6 years and 10 months; M 
IQ=44.50). 
2. Children with mild IDs with organic abnormality 
(M age =10 years and 7 months; M MA=6 years and 
11 months; M IQ=62.30).  
&KLOGUHQZLWKµVRFLRFXOWXUDO¶PLOG,'VM age =10 
years and 5 months; M MA=6 years and 9 months; M 
IQ=61.70).  
4. Children with no-IDs  (M age =6 years and 10 
months; M MA=7 years; M IQ=103.70) 
 
1. Slosson Intelligence 
Test.  




3. Moral Reasoning 
Stories based on 
.RKOEHUJ¶VZRUN- five 
stories with questions 
to elicit moral 
judgement (Porter & 
Taylor, 1972) 
1. Moral reasoning significantly positively 
associated with cognitive maturity and MA.  
Strength of association greater with cognitive 
maturity.  
2. Moral reasoning not associated with CA.  
3. Analysis controlling for MA indicated that 
children with no-IDs scored significantly higher 
than adolescents with moderate IDs and children 
with mild IDs of organic abnormality.  Children 
ZLWKµVRFLRFXOWXUDO¶PLOG,'VKDGVLJQLILFDQWO\
higher moral reasoning than adolescents with 
moderate IDs.  
4. Analysis controlling for cognitive ability 
resulted in no significant differences between the 
groups.  




United States N=60  1. Participants 
taken from 
public schools in 
north-eastern 
United States.  
2. MA 
1. Children with no-IDs RI³/RZ´MA (M IQ=104; 
M age =75 months).  
2. Children with ,'VRI³/RZ´MA (M IQ=76; M age 
=121 months).  . 
3. Children with no-IDs of ³0LGGOH´MA (M 
IQ=115; M age =79 months).  
4. Children with ,'V³0LGGOH´MA (M IQ=76; M age 
=138 months). 
5. Children with no-,'V³+LJK´MA (M IQ=113 M 
age =96 months). 
6. Children with ,'V³+LJK´MA (M IQ=79; M age 
=150 months). 
1. Piagetian Tasks.  
2. Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test 
3. Role taking within 
game play.  
2. Moral Judgement 
Stories from 
Kohlberg.  
1. Significant positive relationship between MA 
and Moral Reasoning, but not IQ, or CA.  
2. No difference between IDs and Non-IDs 
groups on Piagetian tasks; relationship between 
µPHQWDODJH¶DQGSHUIRUPDQFHRQVRPHWDVNV 
3. A relationship between performance on 
Piagetian tasks and moral reasoning stage was 
found for some tasks.   
 
 Miller, Zumoff & 
Stephens (1974) 
United States N=62 1. Random 
selection 
procedures 
1. Adolescent girls with mild IDs (IQ=71.81). 
2. Adolescent girls with no-IDs (IQ=102.19). 
$GROHVFHQWµGHOLQTXHQW¶JLUOV,4 ) 
1. Piagetian reasoning 
tasks.  
2. Unstandardised 
1. No significant difference between groups on 
moral judgement.  
2. Difference between the groups on the Piagetian 
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2. Age 
3. All adolescent 
girls 
moral stories scored 
using a similar system 
employed by 
Kohlberg in his PhD 
thesis.  







& Russell (1983) 




M age =16.2 years 
M MA =11.3 years 




1. No relationship between intelligence or MA 
and moral reasoning.  
2. Significant relationship between moral 
reasoning and disruptive behaviour.  
















1. Children with IDs  (M age=12.2) 
2. Children with No-IDs (M age=7.1) 
1. Jackson 
Hypothetical 




This is a self-report 
measure of behaviour 
in reaction to stories 
depicting stealing 
situations.   
Respondents are 




1. Children with no-,'V³UHVLVWHG´VWHDOLQJPRUH
than children with IDs, and this difference was 
attributable to girls rather than boys.  





Petrovich (1982) England and 
Serbia 
N=170 1. All from 
special schools 
in Belgrade or 
Novi Sad 
IQ range=50 to 70  
M IQ for females=66.43 
M IQ for males=64.88 
 
1. Children were 
interviewed and asked 
to make value 
judgements regarding 
their own behaviour.   
Responses were coded 
into themes based 
around good and bad 
acts.  
2. Frequency tables 
calculated for 
categories of 
responses and trends 
examined. 
1. There were no sex differences for the type of 
categories generated regarding good and bad acts.   
2. There were more bad categories than good.  
3. Developmental trends were noted, but they 
appear to occur later than they do with children 
without IDs.   
 
 
